Exclusive commercial contracts are permitted under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. The legality of the agreement is examined by the Tribunal as follows: two investigations have been conducted to examine the existence of exclusive buyer transactions by Gabrielsen and Sérgard (1999) and Klein and Murphy (2008) investigating exclusive transactions induced by the buyer with a monopoly producer and two suppliers of a particular product. In the model, Gabrielsen and Sérgard (1999) suggest that the retailer decides ex ante to ask suppliers for exclusive or non-exclusive offers. In any case, wholesale prices are dictated by Bertrand_competition model between suppliers. Second, the retailer marks resale rates to buyers in a strategy of double marginalization. The distributor may opt for an exclusive commercial contract with one of the manufacturers, based on the customer`s demand for the brands.  and Klein and Murphy (2008) Participants also stated that “the level of distribution was really important” (75) and that the competitive effects of proprietary wholesale management may differ from those of retailers or end-users. (76) At least one of them found that the risk of anti-competitive damage could depend on the product concerned and stated that if the product was a product that customers would be likely to buy, the exclusive trade could do less harm to competitors, because consumers are “more likely to do so”. see on others .
. . Distributors” when a “distributor has only one brand.” (77) In economics and law, there are many forms of exclusive trade, but the three best known are: this chapter deals with exclusive trade cases, which arise from both Section 2 of the Sherman Act and other legal provisions. Courts are now considering a number of competitive factors in assessing the legality of an exclusivity regime. (16) Among these factors, one panelist argued that the three main (1) were “the nature of the product and the relationship” between the parties to the agreement, (2) the “market percentage” that was closed to competitors as a result of the agreement and (3) the “duration” of the agreement. (17) Professor Hovenkamp explains that exclusive trade “requires an applicant to be able to prove that the defendant has significant market power, that the exclusivity agreement is used to prevent market access to one or more major competitors, and that the production of the consumer market is thus lower (or superior)”. However, these considerations are broader than those addressed in the precedent of the former Supreme Court, which, as described below, focused on whether exclusive trade excluded a significant volume of trade, a priority that would prohibit many exclusivity agreements that the courts maintain today.